1. Introduction. In this paper we apply various results and methods of previous papers on the kernel to four-person games.
Section 2 contains the basic definitions needed. In §3 we prove that the kernel of the general-sum four-person game consists of a line segment (which may shrink to a point). A method for classifying games according to their kernels is suggested in §4 and is used there to characterize all four-person games whose kernel consists of a non-degenerate interval. In the last section, §5, we offer a bargaining procedure, based on principles established in (1) , which leads to the kernel in the case of a non-degenerate interval.
Definitions.
Let N = {1,2,3,4} be a set with four elements. A characteristic function is a non-negative real function v denned on the subsets of N satisfying Let (N\v) be a four-person game. A coalition structure is a partition of N. An individually rational payoff configuration is a pair (x; 33), where 33 is a coalition structure and x = (xi, x 2 , x 3 , xt), the payoff vector, is a quadruple of real numbers that satisfies An individually rational payoff configuration (x; 33) represents a possible outcome of (N;v).
Let i and j be two distinct players. We denote by T tJ the set of all the coalitions that contain player i but do not contain player j; thus 
B. PELEG
The maximum surplus of i over j with respect to (x; S3) is
Hi and j both belong to the same coalition B G S3, then i is said to outweigh j with respect to # if s^(#) > Sji(x) and x ; -> 0. x is balanced if there exists no pair of players h and & such that h outweighs k. The kernel (of the coalition structure S3) is the set of all balanced payoff vectors.
It was shown in (1, §8) that if 53 contains a one-person coalition, then the kernel of S3 consists of a unique payoff vector, which is determined by the kernel of a related three-person game. Thus we can restrict our attention to coalition structures of the following forms:
{1,2,3,4} or {{i,j}, {k, I}}.
3. The geometrical structure of the kernel. Let (N, v) be a four-person game. By S3 we shall denote a coalition structure that appears in (2.7).
Proof. Let x and y be two different vector payoffs in the kernel. As in (1, §8), we write f * = y t -x u i G N, and name the players in such a way that £l < £2 < { 8 < U and that 1 and 4 belong to the same coalition of S3. It was shown in (1, §8) that It follows from (3.2), (3.3), and (3.4) that
(3.1) implies that (3.2), (3.3), and (3.4) hold when we replace 4 by 3 and 1 by 2.
Hence (3.5) is true after making the same replacement. If S is of the type {{hj}> {k> A }> then the above remarks prove that the whole segment with the end points x and y is in the kernel. In the remaining case, S3 = {1, 2, 3, 4}, (3.2) (3.3), and (3.4) hold when we replace 1 by an i 6 {1, 2} and 4 by a je {3,4}. if Proof. By Lemma 3.1 and the remark at the end of §2 the kernel of 93 is convex; by (3, Theorem 6.7), its dimension is at most one. see (3.6). By (3, Theorem 5.4), the kernel intersects the core when the core is not empty. The truth of the corollary is a consequence of these remarks.
We remark that the above result cannot be generalized further. A counterexample is the following: take the constant-sum homogeneous-weighted majority game [ is not contained in the core.
On the classification of games according to their kernels.
In this section we present and use a method for classifying games according to their kernels. Our starting point is (3, §4, Theorems 4.5 and 4.6 and Formula 4.14) where a detailed description of the kernel as a union of convex polyhedra is given. By "classifying games according to their kernels" we understand the determination, for each non-empty subset of convex polyhedra that appear in the representation of the kernel, of the set of all games for which these polyhedra are non-empty; cf. (3, (4.14) and Theorem 4.6). This determination amounts to writing down the inequalities that assure us that some specific set of polyhedra is non-empty, and eliminating the payoff variables from the inequalities. The nature of the inequalities involved in the definition of the kernel enables us to use the method of (2) for eliminating quantified variables ( x out of systems of linear inequalities; indeed this can be done by a computer; for details see (2) . We remark that the method of classification sketched above applies to games with any number of players.
Let (N, v) be a four-person game. From the results of §3 (see also 4) it follows that the kernel of N consists of a non-degenerate interval if and only if, for a suitable naming of the players, the following sentence is true: (This example has been suggested by M. Maschler.) The kernel of the coalition structure N is (x, 1 -x, x, 1 -x), 0 < x < 1. We shall now generalize the arguments given in the analysis of the three-person game (1, §4) to describe a bargaining procedure leading to this result. To make the discussion more vivid let us call players 1 and 3 "workers," and players 2 and 4 "employers."
In the first round of the negotiations each "employer" chooses a "worker"; let us assume that 1 joins 2, and 3 joins 4. The joint profit to each pair is 1, and the question that remains to be decided is the level of * 'wages. " This question is answered by solving the following two interconnected pure (1, Definition 3.1) bargaining 2-person games (described graphically):
The interpretation is clear: The basis for l's claims is the maximum "salary" he will be able to get from 4, etc. Now determining the payoffs using (1, (3.4)), we obtain the kernel. The same procedure leads to the kernels of all the games that satisfy (4.2).
